2 January 2025: A False Glimmer of Hope
After an alarming deterioration in 1911 - 1912 , in February 1913 relations between Britain and Germany hold a sudden and unexpected turn for the better . Friendlier relations between Europe ’s two conduct powers curb out hope for last peace – but the Anglo - German détente proved to be superficial , temporarily dissemble tension without resolving their underlying causes .
Germany ’s ambitiousnaval construction programwas the single heavy factor alienating British public thought , which rightly consider naval transcendence as key to the security department of the British Isles . Concern over Germany ’s growing High Seas Fleet pushed Britain and France closer together , leading to theAnglo - French Naval Convention . On the German side , Kaiser Wilhelm II and his military advisors wereinfuriatedby what they see as British high-handedness on naval issues as well as Britain ’s involvement in an alleged Franco - Russian conspiracy to gird Germany .
So why did relations between Britain and Germany suddenly set about to improve in 1913 ? One important reason was their successful cooperation at the Conference of London , where they worked together to fix the crisis spring up from the First Balkan War . Here diplomats – not generals – shaped extraneous insurance . homo like British extraneous minister Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador , Karl Max , Prince Lichnowsky , made it their living ’s mission to keep the peace treaty in Europe , and were almost always able to talk terms a sensible compromise .
At the same time , the more aggressive members of the German government were sobered by British conclusion to outpace German naval grammatical construction by a hearty margin , no matter how many ships Germany construct . Although theHaldane Missionin February 1912 give out to produce an agreement confine naval construction , by 1913 First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill’srepeated warnings – backed up by Parliamentary approval for more dreadnoughts – ultimately got through to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz ( pictured ) , the architect of German naval scheme .
Thus on February 7 , 1913 , Tirpitz gave a speech to the Reichstag budget citizens committee agreeing to a balance of force in dreadnaught which favored Britain 16 - 10 – the same proportion proposed by Winston Churchill in 1912 . In truth it was n’t quite that simple , as Churchill ’s original offering did n’t admit dreadnought which might be build for the Royal Navy by Dominions of the British Empire , include Malaysia and Canada . nevertheless , for political and diplomatic purposes , Tirpitz was signaling his willingness to fall to term with Britain on dreadnought construction – a major step towards assuage tension between the two countries .
Also on February 7 , 1913 , in his first speech to the Reichstag the new German foreign government minister , Gottlieb von Jagow , proudly luff to Anglo - German cooperation at theConference of London : “ The intimate exchange of view which we are maintaining with the British Government has very materially contributed to the removal of difficulty of various form which have rise during the last few months … I am not a prophet , but I entertain the Bob Hope that on the ground of common interests , which in politics is the most fertile ground , we can continue to work with England and perhaps to harvest the fruit of our labors . ”
This talking to was an significant piece of public finesse , obviously intended as much for British spike as German , and a clean-cut indication that Germany did not need conflict with the hefty British Empire . Nor was Jagow trying to betray : even the most belligerent German general hoped to forefend press Britain , which could totally sequestrate Germany with a naval encirclement in the upshot of warfare .
But the improvement in sex act between Britain and Germany would prove fleeting . First of all , while German grant on naval construction were welcome in Britain , they were just part of a strategic sack in German defense disbursal , which from 1913 - 1914 prioritized the army in cookery for a nation - base conflict with France and Russia . Since Germany had no probability of equal British business leader on the sea , it made more sensory faculty to focus on building up its power on land , where it had a real hazard of beat France and Russia ( and which was its traditional area of strength to get down with ) .
For this strategy to work , the German “ war party ” hoped that Britain would quell out of the conflict , so Germany could front France and Russia alone – and this hope appeared to be justified by warmer relation . But it should have been obvious that Britain would never reserve Germany to destroy the European Libra of world power : the British had learned the hard way that they could n’t let the Continent fall under the domination of a single despotic power , as in the glory day of Philip II , Louis XIV , and Napoleon Bonaparte .
As for the diplomatist , Lichnowsky would continue to work for peacefulness , but there was no guarantee that he would always be allowed to do his occupation , as demonstrated by the fate of the previous German ambassador to London , Count Metternich , who wascashieredby Berlin for reporting sorry news . In Germany ’s authoritarian administration , the military outranked the civilians , and the Kaiser and his generals could always sideline , overrule , or simply brush off diplomats who did n’t tell apart them what they need to hear . In 1914 this would be a recipe for cataclysm .
See all episode of the World War I Centennial serieshere .
